The Polish family law system provides for three basic types of property regimes that may arise between spouses. The first is the so-called statutory community regulated in the provisions of art. 31-46 of the Family and Guardianship Code (Act of February 25, 1964. Family and Guardianship Code (i.e. Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1359), in which the assets owned by the spouses are subject to the appropriate classification for one of three categories, such as: joint property, husband’s personal property and wife’s personal property.The second solution provided by the legislator is the so-called contractual property regime (Art. 47-50(1) of the Family and Guardianship Code). In this case, the spouses pursuant to the concluded agreement, they extend or limit the rules of statutory joint ownership (within the limits allowed by the law) or decide to carry out property separation (including in the variant of property separation with the equalization of the acquis). property separation itself under the so-called compulsory property regime (Articles 52-54 of the Family and Guardianship Code). Such a situation occurs only as a consequence of the issuance of by a court decision as a result of a request made by one of the spouses, alternatively also as a result of one of the spouses being declared bankrupt or incapacitated, and additionally also at the time of separation or separation.
After the separation of property, there may be a need to divide the previously created joint property of the spouses. In accordance with the regulation of civil law, the provisions on the division of inheritance apply accordingly to such proceedings (Article 567 § 3 i and Article 688 of the Act of November 17, 1964. Code of Civil Procedure (i.e. Journal of Laws of 2021, item 1805 as amended)), which, in turn, direct the authority applying the law to the appropriate application of the provisions on the procedure carried out as part of the abolition of co-ownership in matters not regulated by it. As a result, the court dividing the joint property decides on the mutual claims of the spouses for the possession and use of the joint property, benefits and revenues received, expenditures made and debts repaid.
An interesting issue related to the situation outlined above is undoubtedly the case in which one of the spouses, after a divorce has been issued by the competent district court, and before the division of the joint property by the competent district court, sells the property from the joint property. The jurisprudence that has developed in the context of this problem provides for the principle that after the termination of the statutory community, the regulation by one of the spouses (former spouses) of a share in an item belonging to the joint property requires the consent of the former spouse. At the same time, it is assumed that in its absence, the regulation is ineffective against the spouse who did not consent. In fact, such a situation raises a problem of such a nature that the court, recognizing the ordinance as ineffective in relation to the other former spouse, should divide the joint property as if the ordinance did not exist. The authority is obliged to take into account the condition of this item at the time of termination of the statutory community, determine its value according to its market value at the time of adjudication and make appropriate settlements between the spouses. The conclusions drawn above are mainly the subject of jurisprudence considerations, and one of the relatively newer judgments related to the subject matter is the decision of the Supreme Court of April 16, 2014, V CSK 315/13. Undeniably, it is noteworthy that an unlawful disposal of a component of the joint property of a divorced spouse made before the division of joint property results not so much in the invalidity of the legal act as another sanction in the form of ineffectiveness towards the other divorced spouse. This is to protect the property interest of such a spouse waiting for a fair division of the existing joint property. This undoubtedly implements the directive of observing the principles of social coexistence known to civil law. One may wonder, however, whether the introduction of the sanction of invalidity of the legal transaction performed would not be more transparent for the addressees of the law and would not facilitate the very procedure of property division.