In the judgments issued by the Supreme Court, i.e. in the resolution of May 19, 1989, reference number III CZP 52/89 and the decision of January 31, 2013, reference number II CSK 349/12, the adjudicating panel deals with the principles of division joint property of the spouses in the event of termination of the community of property. The most common reason for this is the dissolution of a marriage by divorce. However, the method of dividing is often a problematic issue, which is why the case law often specifies the rules outlined by the legislator.
In the second of these The majority of Supreme Court rulings refer to the very concept of common property components covered by the obligation to divide between former spouses. The Polish legal system assumes that in matters not regulated in the Family and Guardianship Code, from the moment of termination of the statutory community of property, the provisions on the community of inheritance property and on the division of inheritance (Article 46 of the Family and Guardianship Code) apply accordingly to the property that was covered by it, as well as to the division of this property. Therefore, the Supreme Court, on the basis of the said provision, made an interpretation in the light of which the principle is the obligation to divide the joint property that belonged to this property at the time of termination of the community property and still exist at the time of the division.
In the above-mentioned resolution, the adjudicating panel focuses its considerations on the issue of the impact of damage caused unintentionally during the duration of statutory joint ownership by the spouse in joint property. The Supreme Court admits that it does not affect settlements in proceedings for the division of joint property, but it may affect the manner of its division. The position of the Supreme Court was the result of a rather interesting factual situation in which the spouse unintentionally caused a fire, as a result of which some items of the household appliance were burnt. The insurer then paid the claim. In the case of division of the property, the court assumed that the amount of the property should include the sum of compensation paid by the insurer, and not the value of individual items that were destroyed by the fire. However, this position was challenged by the ex-wife. The complainant demanded that the value of the items that had been burnt be included in the distribution mass instead of the compensation paid by the insurer. The outlined facts implied the need for the court to determine the mass of joint property subject to division. As a rule, it has been assumed that the entire property relationship as at the date of termination of the statutory community is subject to settlement, while the active status of the property mass at the time of division is subject to division. Therefore, the court considered that the items that had been burned could not be divided for obvious reasons, and therefore the division had to be related to the amount of insurance paid out.
The judgments cited above undoubtedly indicate a clear scope for possible abuses in the context of the procedure for the division of joint property. The provisions constructed by the legislator contain many references, which makes it difficult to interpret them. In view of the above, an extensive interpretation of common courts, carrying a clarifying value, should be considered justified.